The causal Markov condition (CMC) plays an important role in much recent work on the problem of causal inference from statistical data. It is commonly thought that the CMC is a more problematic assumption for genuinely indeterministic systems than for deterministic ones. In this essay, I critically examine this proposition. I show how the usual motivation for the CMC-that it is true of any acyclic, deterministic causal system in which the exogenous variables are independent-can be extended to the indeterministic case. In light of this result, I consider several arguments for supposing indeterminism a particularly hostile environment for the CMC, but conclude that none are persuasive.
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Introduction
A wealth of recent work, much of it encapsulated in Peter Spirtes, Clark Glymour & Richard Scheines (hereafter SGS) ([2000] ) and Judea Pearl ([2000] ), has systematically explored the possibilities of inferring causal conclusions from statistical data, provided that certain assumptions connecting probability and causality are granted. Central among these assumptions is what has come to be known as the causal Markov condition (CMC). Put roughly, the CMC states that, for any variable X and any set of variables Y that do not include effects of X, X is probabilistically independent of Y conditional on the direct causes of X. Given the important role that the causal Markov condition plays in causal inference, it is of interest to inquire into the justification for invoking it. Probably the most common basis provided for the CMC is that it is true of acyclic, deterministic causal systems in which the exogenous variables are probabilistically independent (cf. Pearl [2000], p. 30; SGS [2000] , p. 32; Glymour [2001] , p. 27).
1 I shall call this claim the causal Markov theorem.
The causal Markov theorem is sometimes taken to suggest that the CMC is a more secure assumption for deterministic causal systems than it is for indeterministic ones. For example, Nancy Cartwright writes 'the Markov condition is in general not satisfied when causes act probabilistically, though it may be appropriate for many kinds of deterministic models ' (cf. [1999b] , p. 3). Indeterminism seems to raise problems for the CMC by calling into question an implication of it, the 'screening-off ' rule. The screening-off rule asserts that if X and Y are related only as effects of a common cause Z, then X and Y are probabilistically independent conditional on Z. The screening-off rule is sometimes said to be trivially true when the causal relationships are deterministic (cf. Cartwright [1999a] , pp. 108, 114), but for genuinely probabilistic cases, there appears to be little reason why the screening-off rule must be correct (cf. Salmon [1984] , pp. 168-70; Cartwright [1999a] , p. 109). As a result, the CMC is apparently an especially problematic assumption for indeterministic systems.
In the present essay, I critically examine this proposition. First, I explain and present the causal Markov theorem. Next, I turn to a consideration of whether the scope of the theorem can be extended to encompass genuinely indeterministic cases. I show that this is indeed possible; in particular, determinism, though sufficient in conjunction with the other two conditions, is stronger than necessary. Determinism entails that the influence of cause upon effect can be represented by functional models (FMs) , and this in turn serves as a vital premise in the proof of the theorem. However, the possibility of representing causal relationships via FMs does not entail determinism, since FMs can also be used to represent genuinely indeterministic causal relationships. The basic insight is that exogenous variables in an FM can be interpreted either as representing causes or genuine indeterminism and that the choice of interpretation makes no difference to the causal Markov theorem. Given this set-up, indeterministic counter-examples to CMC are ones in which not all exogenous variables are probabilistically independent. Since correlated exogenous terms also give rise to failures of the CMC in the context of deterministic systems, this calls into question the common judgment that fundamentally indeterministic systems constitute an especially hostile ground for the CMC.
If there is indeed some reason why the CMC is on firmer footing for deterministic causal systems than elsewhere, then it is presumably that the conditions of the causal Markov theorem are more readily secured in that context. Since there seems little reason to suppose that indeterministic causal systems are more prone than deterministic ones to be cyclic, the difference, if there is one, must be that the assumption that exogenous variables are independent is somehow more reliable in the deterministic case. I consider several potential arguments for this claim, and conclude that none of them is persuasive. In the context of a well-designed and implemented controlled experiment, the assumption that exogenous variables are independent is on firm ground whether the process is deterministic or indeterministic. Outside of this context, no compelling, general justification for this assumption has been provided, either for deterministic or indeterministic cases.
Functional models and directed graphs
In this section, I explicate the three conditions that occur in the antecedent of the causal Markov theorem: that the causal system under consideration is deterministic and acyclic, and that the exogenous variables are independent. Causal systems are to be understood here as actual complexes of entities in which causal relationships occur, such as a computer, a colony of bacteria, or a stock exchange. The causal relations that arise in such systems can be represented in various ways, two of which will be considered here: functional models and directed graphs.
Let us begin with functional models (FMs). As I use the term, an FM consists of a set of equations and an associated probability distribution. The set of equations is formed from the following elements: a set of endogenous variables X ¼ {X 1 , . . ., X n }, a set of functions F ¼ { f 1 , . . ., f n }, and a set of exogenous variables or error terms U ¼ {U 1 , . . ., U k }. In an FM, each endogenous variable X i occurs as a function, f i , of a non-empty subset of ((X [ U) À {X i }), while no member of U occurs as a dependent variable in any equation. The following is an example of an FM (where lowercase letters denote particular values of the variables denoted by the corresponding capital letters):
In each equation, the variables on the right-hand side are the parents of the one the left. For example, in (1), X 1 and U 2 are the parents of X 2 . I shall use the expression Parents(X) to denote the set of parents of the variable X.
Discussions of FMs often presume that there is exactly one exogenous parent for each endogenous variable (cf. Pearl [2000], pp. 26-8) . I shall treat this as an assumption that may or may not be appropriate in a particular case. Consequently, the number of variables in U need not be equal to that in X. For example, the parents of an endogenous variable might consist solely of other endogenous variables, or an endogenous variable might have more than one exogenous parent, or two endogenous variables may share an exogenous parent. For instance:
Since it is typically assumed that there is a probability distribution over the exogenous variables, I will include that probability distribution as part of the FM. Hence, put formally, an FM is a quadruple hF, X, U, Pi, where P is the probability distribution over the exogenous variables and F, X, and U are defined as explained above. It will be useful to explain how directed graphs relate to FMs. Directed graphs consist of arrows linking nodes that correspond to variables; if there is an arrow directly from X to Y, then X is a parent of Y in the graph. Given the shared concept of a parent, it follows that for each FM, there is a unique corresponding directed graph. For instance, the graph corresponding to (1) is:
while the graph corresponding to (2) is:
As in the case of FMs, I will take directed graphs to be associated with probability distributions. If G is the directed graph that corresponds to the Figure 2 functional model M whose probability distribution is P, then the probability distribution for the variables in G is also P. This straightforward correspondence between FMs and directed graphs is useful, since some concepts that are important for discussing the CMC are much more intuitively presented in terms of directed graphs than in terms of FMs. Let us say that Y is a descendant of X in a graph just in case X is identical to Y or there is at least one directed path from X to Y. A directed path from X to Y is simply a sequence of arrows all aligned in the same direction leading from X to Y. For example, in Figure 1 there are seven directed paths, including one from U 1 to X 2 , and another from X 1 to X 2 . The concept of a descendant plays a role in the statement of the CMC, and its role there will indicate why it is useful to have every variable be a descendant of itself. For convenience, the set of descendants of a variable X in a given directed graph or FM will be denoted by Descendants(X).
In graphical terms, an exogenous variable is one that is not a descendant of any other (i.e. distinct) variable in the graph. One of the conditions in the antecedent of the causal Markov theorem was that the exogenous variables are independent of one another. This condition can be defined more precisely as follows:
Independence of Exogenous Variables: For each U i in U and every U j in }(U À {U i }), U i is probabilistically independent of U j .
As before, U is the set of exogenous variables; hence, (U À {U i }) is the set formed by removing U i from U. Finally, }(U À {U i }) is the power set of (U À {U i }); that is, the set of all subsets of (U À {U i }). Thus, the above proposition asserts that each exogenous variable is probabilistically independent of all other exogenous variables, in all combinations.
An FM is said to be acyclic when there are no two distinct variables X i and X j in X such that X i is a descendant of X j , and X j is a descendant of X i . For example, (1) and (2) are acyclic, while the following FM is not:
The FM in (3) corresponds to the following graph:
An important feature of acyclic FMs is that they can be written in what is known as reduced form; that is, it is possible to restate any acyclic FM in such a way that each endogenous variable is a function solely of the exogenous variables from which it descends. For instance, the reduced form of (1) is the following:
Cyclic FMs, in contrast, cannot always be so rewritten, as can be appreciated through an examination of (3). This feature of acyclic FMs is relevant to the proof of the causal Markov theorem. An FM or directed graph might be acyclic with independent exogenous variables whether or not it is intended to represent causal relationships or merely, say, correlations. In contrast, the determinism cannot be adequately interpreted as a mere formal feature of a system of equations. As Bertrand Russell noted, it will not do to define determinism merely as the thesis that future states of the world can be written as a function of those at earlier times, for then determinism becomes a mere trivial truth ([1953] , pp. 400-1). Such a definition fails because not any old function will do: the function should represent nomic, or lawlike, connections (cf. Earman [1986] , pp. 12-4). Since the concepts of nomic and causal connections are very closely related, 2 determinism and causality are likewise intimately intertwined.
Consequently, the concept of a functional causal model will be helpful for defining the term 'determinism' in the present context. As the name suggests, functional causal models are a type of FM that represent causal relationships, and hence which presuppose the notions of causal generalization and direct cause (cf. Pearl [2000] , p. 27). Of course, the question of what distinguishes causal generalizations from other generalizations is a topic that is beyond the scope of this essay, so I simply refer to the reader to supplementary sources and proceed under the assumption that the concept is antecedently understood. 3 The notion of direct cause will likewise be left unexplicated for the purposes of this essay, except for the simple point that the distinction between direct and indirect causes is relative to the set of variables being considered. What is a direct cause in one analysis might be indirect given a more finegrained description of the causal system. Functional causal models, then, make claims about which of the variables under consideration are direct causes of which others. The standard convention is that the functional causal model says that X is a direct cause of Y exactly if X is a parent of Y in the model. I shall follow this practice, but with one modification designed to enable functional causal models to represent indeterministic causal systems. The modification is that some parents may not be direct causes. Consider a functional model M with a set of variables V ¼ (X [ U). For any V in V, let DirectCauses(V) be the subset of V such that, according to M, each member of DirectCauses(V) is a direct cause of V. A functional causal model, then, is any functional model M that satisfies these two conditions: first, all of the equations in M are interpreted as causal generalizations, and, second, for any V in M, DirectCauses(V) is a subset of Parents(V).
Given this set up, we can return to the question of what is meant in the present context by a deterministic causal system. Recall that causal systems are the actual processes that FMs represent; a deterministic causal system, then, is one that is correctly represented by a deterministic FM. The formal statement and proof of the causal Markov theorem, however, will be put in terms of deterministic FMs rather than causal systems.
When FMs and directed graphs are used to represent causal systems, the identification of parents with direct causes is usually assumed as a matter of course (cf. Pearl [2000] , p. 27; SGS [2000] , p. 24). However, as we will see below, an examination of the manner in which genuinely indeterministic causal systems can be represented by FMs requires that the concepts of parents and direct causes be kept carefully distinct, and that assumptions regarding their relation be made explicit.
The causal Markov theorem
The Markov condition asserts that each variable is probabilistically independent of its non-descendants conditional on its parents. This can be stated in terms of FMs as follows:
Markov Condition (MC): Let M be a functional model with a variable set V ¼ (X [ U) and a probability distribution P over U. Then M satisfies the Markov condition if and only if, for every V 2 V, V is probabilistically independent of (V À Descendants(V)) conditional on Parents(V).
The MC makes no mention of causality; parents might or might not be interpreted as direct causes. For example, if the FM is a regression model, parents might be interpreted as predictors, which are not necessarily causes. Note that we could have just as easily stated the MC in terms of directed graphs. Clearly, an FM satisfies the MC just in case its corresponding directed graph does so as well.
The causal Markov condition, mentioned in the introduction, is different than the MC in that it makes the interpretation of parents as direct causes explicit (cf. SGS [2000] , p. 29; Hausman & Woodward [1999] , pp. 522-3). Specifically, the causal Markov condition is stated in terms of causal graphs, where a causal graph is any directed graph in which the parent relationship is interpreted to mean direct cause. The causal Markov condition can then be stated as follows:
Causal Markov Condition (CMC): Let G be a directed graph with a variable set V ¼ (X [ U) and a probability distribution P over U. Then G satisfies the causal Markov condition if and only if G is a causal graph and G satisfies the Markov condition.
The difference between the CMC and MC, then, is simply that only causal graphs can satisfy the CMC. Notice that the causal graph that corresponds to a deterministic FM is identical to the corresponding directed graph, since in a deterministic FM all parents are direct causes. For example, if (1) is a deterministic FM that satisfies the MC, then the graph in Figure 1 satisfies the CMC.
Given this set-up, the causal Markov theorem can be stated in the following way:
Causal Markov Theorem: If M is an acyclic, deterministic functional model with independent exogenous variables, then the causal graph that corresponds to M satisfies the Markov condition.
I approach the causal Markov theorem by first noting that any acyclic FM in which the exogenous variables are independent satisfies MC, and then observing that the causal Markov theorem follows as an immediate corollary given the definition of a deterministic FM.
Markov Theorem: Let M be a functional model with a variable set V ¼ (X [ U) and a probability distribution P over U. Then if M is acyclic with independent exogenous variables, M satisfies the Markov condition.
A proof of the theorem is given in the Appendix. From the Markov theorem, it immediately follows that any acyclic, deterministic FM with independent exogenous variables satisfies the MC. However, to establish the causal Markov theorem, we need to show that the causal graph corresponding to the FM satisfies the Markov condition. But this follows straightaway from the definition of a deterministic FM.
The necessity of the assumption that exogenous variables are independent to the causal Markov theorem can be illustrated by the graph in Figure 1 , which corresponds to the FM in (1). In this case, P(X 2 j{X 1 , U 2 }) will always equal one or zero for any values of the variables, and hence it is trivial that, for example, P(X 2 j{X 1 , U 2 }) ¼ P(X 2 j {X 3 , X 1 , U 2 }). But the MC implies more than this. If the graph in Figure 1 satisfies the MC, then each exogenous variable is unconditionally independent of the others, since the set of parents of each exogenous variable is empty. Yet the assumption that each endogenous variable is determined by its direct causes does not ensure that this is the case. Likewise, if the graph satisfies the MC, then X 2 and X 3 are independent conditional on X 1 . But this could fail to be the case if U 2 and U 3 were correlated. Thus, the familiar rule that common causes screen off their joint effects from one another can fail for deterministic systems if exogenous variables are probabilistically dependent. Determinism, then, is sufficient neither for the MC nor for the screening-off rule.
Since it is rarely the case that all relevant variables are measured, it is worth considering when the CMC will continue to hold when some have been omitted. We can approach this question by reference to the concept of a restricted graph:
Definition of Restricted Graph: Let G be a directed graph with a variable set V and probability distribution P, and let G' also be a directed graph with a variable set V' and probability distribution P'. Then G' is a restricted graph of G if and only if:
For example, the following is a restricted graph of the directed graph in Figure 1: 4 The MC can also fail for deterministic cyclic systems with independent exogenous variables (cf. Glymour [1997] , p. 207).
X1
X 2 X 3 Figure 4 Likewise, the following is a restricted graph of the directed graph in Figure 2 :
In this case, X 2 , the intermediary between X 1 and X 3 , was among the variables omitted from the restricted-graph. Thus, by clause (c) of the definition, in the restricted-graph X 1 and U 2 are parents of X 3 .
Let us say that X is a common ancestor of Y and Z if and only if there is a directed path from X to Y and another from X to Z, and that these two paths share no variable in common other than X. For example, in Figure 2 , U 2 is a common ancestor of X 1 and X 2 , but X 1 is not a common ancestor of X 2 and X 3 . Let us say that G' is a sufficient restricted graph of G if and only if G' is a restricted graph of G and, for any variables V i and V j in G', if V ca is a common ancestor of V i and V j in G, then V ca is in G'. Then we can state the following:
Restricted-Graph Theorem: If G is an acyclic directed graph that satisfies the Markov condition and G' is a sufficient restricted-graph of G, then G' also satisfies the Markov condition.
A proof of the restricted-graph theorem is provided in the appendix. To illustrate the restricted-graph theorem, note that if the graphs in Figures 1 and 2 satisfy the CMC, then so do the restricted graphs in Figures 4 and 5. 
The causal Markov theorem and genuine indeterminism
Causal relationships among variables that we can actually measure rarely appear deterministic, and there are, of course, two potential explanations for such appearances. The indeterministic relationship might be only apparent, in which case considering hidden causes would reveal the deterministic causal nexus. This type of situation can be called pseudo-indeterminism (cf. SGS [2000] , p. 15). For example, if the FM in (1) is deterministic, then the graph in Figure 4 is pseudo-indeterministic: it appears indeterministic, but would become deterministic if the exogenous causes were added back in. Given the restricted-graph theorem, we can see that any pseudo-indeterministic acyclic directed graph will satisfy the MC if the underlying deterministic FM does so and no common ancestors are omitted.
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The other possibility is that the apparent indeterministic relationships are genuinely so; they would persist no matter what further hidden causes were included in the analysis. Let us consider how genuinely indeterministic causal processes can be represented by FMs. I propose to do this by allowing that some members of U are what I shall call pseudo-hidden variables, which resemble hidden variables except that they do not represent causes. Consider the following, somewhat facetious, example. Imagine a special type of car, the quantum car. The ignition of the quantum car works by means of a fundamentally indeterministic process: when the key is turned, there is an irreducible probability of .85 that the car will start. Clearly, there is no deterministic FM that correctly represents the quantum car, since that would imply that there is some cause which, together with the turning of the key, determines whether the car starts. Nevertheless, we can represent the situation with an indeterministic FM in the following manner. Let X 1 be a binary variable indicating whether the key is turned (X 1 ¼ 1 indicates that it has been), and let X 2 be a binary variable representing whether the car starts (X 2 ¼ 1 indicates that it does). Let U 1 be an exogenous parent of X 1 , and let U 2 be a binary variable with the probability distribution p(U 2 ¼ 1) ¼ .85. Then the following FM can be used to represent the quantum car:
It was presumed that X 1 is a direct cause of X 2 , and there is nothing in the example to indicate that U 1 is not likewise a direct cause of X 1 . However, it is clear that that U 2 , although a parent of X 2 , cannot be a direct cause of it. Thus, (5) is not a deterministic FM, since one of the parents of X 2 is not a direct cause. How, then, should U 2 be interpreted? One could think of U 2 , in conjunction with its probability distribution, as representing the indeterministic causal influence of X 1 upon X 2 , but just how one interprets U 2 is of lesser importance than the point that U 2 does not represent an omitted cause of X 2 . Notice that nothing in the general characterization of an FM excludes interpreting some parents as representing causes and others differently, since the definition of an FM is silent with respect to how parents are interpreted. I shall use the expression pseudo-hidden variable to refer to variables like U 2 that do not represent causes and that are introduced to represent a fundamentally indeterministic causal process.
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I will assume that all pseudo-hidden variables are exogenous, and that each pseudo-hidden variable is the parent of exactly one endogenous variable. For example, in (5), U 2 is exogenous and is a parent only of X 2 . These two assumptions seem entirely innocuous. It is hard to see why one would want to suppose that a pseudo-hidden variable is a descendant of another variable (and hence not exogenous). In general, since pseudo-hidden variables are representational devices that do not denote causes or effects, decisions concerning their mode of depiction are mere conventions and not substantive assumptions. Let U pseudo be the set of pseudo-indeterministic variables in a given FM. Then we can define an indeterministic FM as follows:
Definition of Indeterministic Functional Model: The functional model M is indeterministic if and only if M is a functional causal model, U pseudo is not empty, and for each variable V in M, the set of (Parents( V) À U pseudo ) is identical to DirectCauses(V).
In short, an indeterministic FM is a functional causal model in which all of the parents are direct causes, except for some non-empty set of pseudo-hidden variables. In parallel to the deterministic case, we can say that an indeterministic causal system is one that is correctly represented by an indeterministic FM.
The above procedure for representing indeterministic causal systems with FMs makes it possible to extend the results from Section 3 to the indeterministic case. To see how this works, observe that for any indeterministic functional model M, the corresponding causal graph is the directed graph that corresponds to M, but with the pseudo-hidden variables omitted. That is, in a causal graph, only variables representing causes are included, since the parent relation indicates direct cause. For example, the directed graph that corresponds to (5) is:
But the causal graph corresponding to (5) is the following:
Given the concept of the causal graph that corresponds to an indeterministic FM, we can state the following theorem:
Indeterministic Causal Markov Theorem: If M is an acyclic, indeterministic FM with independent exogenous variables, then the causal graph that corresponds to M satisfies the Markov condition.
X1 X2 U1
Figure 7 The indeterministic causal Markov theorem follows easily from the Markov and restricted-graph theorems, together with the definition of an indeterministic FM. Since M is an acyclic FM with independent exogenous variables, it satisfies the MC. Recall that each pseudo-hidden variable is exogenous and is the parent of only one endogenous variable, which means that no pseudo-hidden variable is a common ancestor. But since the causal graph G that corresponds to the indeterministic functional model M omits only pseudo-hidden variables, it follows from the restricted-graph theorem that G satisfies the CMC. Thus, the causal Markov theorem can be extended to the indeterministic case: the conditions that suffice for the CMC for deterministic systems also suffice for indeterministic ones. Let us consider this point in the context of an indeterministic counter-example to the CMC. Cartwright ([1999a] , pp. 108-10) imagines a factory that produces a chemical used for treating sewage but which also produces a pollutant as a by-product. In the example, there is a perfect correlation between the production of the chemical and the by-product, but the cause (an unspecified aspect of the production process of the factory) is purely probabilistic, generating the chemical only 80% of the time. Let X represent the production of the chemical, Y the production of the by-product, and C the unspecified aspect of the production process that is the common cause. Cartwright argues that this example constitutes an exception to CMC, since X and Y are not probabilistically independent-conditional on C. It is disputable whether this is a serious objection to the CMC, since it is unclear what basis there would be for assuming that C is the only common cause of X and Y in any real example of the sort Cartwright imagines (cf. Hausman & Woodward [1999] , pp. 560-4; Glymour [1999] , pp. 72-3).
However, my purpose here is not to argue about the merits of Cartwright's example as an argument against the CMC. Instead, let us consider how the example might be represented with an FM. Cartwright suggests such a representation herself (cf. [2002] , p. 436). Since x and y are exogenous, Cartwright's example violates one of the antecedent conditions of the Markov theorem, namely, that exogenous variables are probabilistically independent. Considered in abstraction from the details of the story that accompanies the equations in (6), then, Cartwright's example illustrates that the screening-off rule can fail when exogenous variables are correlated, as was pointed out in Section 3. But this is true of both deterministic and indeterministic causal systems. For example, given the probability distribution over x and y , the FM in (6) would fail to satisfy the CMC even if these two variables represented exogenous, yet correlated, direct causes. In short, what generates the exception to the CMC in (6) is the correlation of the exogenous variables; whether these are interpreted as pseudo-hidden variables or direct causes is immaterial. Hence, without further elaboration, the example does not demonstrate a challenge for the CMC that arises particularly in the indeterministic case.
If there is any reason to suppose that deterministic causal systems are a more favorable environment for the CMC, then the reason must be that deterministic systems are more likely to be acyclic or more likely to have independent exogenous variables. It is hard to see why deterministic causal systems would be more likely to be acyclic than indeterministic ones. Hence, if the CMC is a firmer supposition in the deterministic case, then the independence of exogenous variables must somehow be more secure in that context. Let us consider whether there is any persuasive reason to think that this so.
Are the exogenous variables independent?
The assumption that exogenous variables are independent is undoubtedly on firmest ground in the context of a well-designed and well-implemented controlled experiment. Following Pearl ([2000] ) and SGS ([2000] ), I interpret an ideal controlled experiment as an intervention. In terms of FMs, an intervention on a variable X 'wipes out' the right-hand side of the equation in which X appears as the dependent variable, and makes X a function of an exogenous variable that we know is independent of all of the other exogenous variables (cf. Pearl [2000] , pp. 32-3).
For example, the following are FMs that would result from an intervention on X 1 in the FMs (2) and (3) from Section 2, respectively.
In this case, the variable representing the intervention is I. Suppose that we are interested in learning the influence, if any, of X 1 upon X 2 . Notice that, given an intervention upon X 1 , X 1 is not a descendant of X 2 , nor is there any common ancestor of X 1 and X 2 . Thus, the CMC entails that if X 1 and X 2 are found to be probabilistically dependent in a controlled experiment in which X 1 is the target of the intervention, then X 1 is a cause of X 2 . Consequently, the CMC is a very useful assumption to have in the context of a controlled experiment, 8 and we can show that in this context it is irrelevant whether the FM is deterministic or indeterministic. Let M be a post intervention functional model for X 1 and X 2 if and only if M is an FM in which X 1 and X 2 are endogenous variables that represents a causal system in which there is an intervention on X 1 . Then we can state the following:
Intervention Theorem: Let G be the directed graph that corresponds to M, and let G' be the restricted graph of G in which only X 1 and X 2 are included. Then if M is either a deterministic or an indeterministic, acyclic, post-intervention, functional model for X 1 and X 2 , G' satisfies the causal Markov condition.
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A proof of the intervention theorem is provided in the Appendix. Controlled experiments, then, are one way of securing the independence of exogenous variables, but are a stratagem that works equally well for indeterministic as well as deterministic causal systems. Is there any reason, then, for thinking that exogenous variables are more likely to be independent in the case of deterministic causal systems outside the context of controlled experiments? One motivation that is sometimes provided for the independence of exogenous variables for deterministic FMs is that it follows from the following two assumptions (cf. Hausman & Woodward [1999], p. 553; Pearl [2000] , p. 30):
Causal Sufficiency: There are no common causes of any exogenous causes.
Principle of the Common Cause (PCC): If X and Y are probabilistically dependent, then X is a cause of Y, Y is a cause of X, or there is a third variable that is a common cause of X and Y.
The PCC is naturally interpreted as applying only in the case in which X and Y are variables that could potentially represent causes or effects.
Thus, while causal sufficiency and the PCC jointly entail that the exogenous causes are independent, it would not imply that all pseudo-hidden variables are such, since pseudo-hidden variables are not causes. Therefore, causal sufficiency and the PCC considered in tandem might be viewed as an argument for the claim that the CMC is more reliable for deterministic than indeterministic systems. Let us examine this reasoning more carefully.
Causal sufficiency is rarely a plausible assumption for sets of actually measured variables outside of the experimental context. Nevertheless, it might seem reasonable to take causal sufficiency to be a feature of the underlying system that is being studied in however partial and incomplete a fashion. The thought is that if causal chains were to be traced back far enough, then all common causes could in principle be taken into account. There is, however, no guarantee that this would be possible even in principle; for example, there might be an infinite regress of common causes. But this concern aside, the in-principle possibility that the underlying causal system can be represented by a causally sufficient FM has some plausibility.
Let us turn, then, to the PCC. What basis is there for this principle? One straightforward motivation for it is that it is true of any acyclic system that satisfies the CMC, which in turn was motivated by the theorems presented in Sections 3 and 4. But of course, arguing for the PCC in such a manner is viciously circular in the present context. The problem at issue is that of providing a basis for the assumption that exogenous variables are independent; but the theorems provided to motivate the CMC in Sections 3 and 4 presuppose this assumption. Moreover, if we consider ways in which exogenous variables can fail to be independent (other than a failure of causal sufficiency), we find that these are also ways in which the PCC could be false.
For example, it is a familiar fact that when the means of the distributions of two variables increase monotonically over time, the variables will be probabilistically dependent even if there is no causal connection of any sort between them (cf. SGS [2000], p. 37; Sober [2001] ; Steel [2003] ). Hence, this type of scenario is one in which exogenous variables might fail to be independent, and it is also a situation in which the PCC can be false. Exogenous variables can also be probabilistically dependent when two or more of these variables are causes of inclusion in the population from which the probability distribution arises. For example, suppose the population in question consists of Vietnam veterans. Let P be a binary variable indicating whether a given individual was patriotic prior to receiving any information regarding whether or not he was drafted, and let D be a binary variable indicating whether the individual's draft number was called. Since P is prior to D, D is not a cause of P, and since Vietnam-era draft numbers were selected by a random process, P does not cause D, nor is there a common cause of the two. Nevertheless, it is plausible that P and D are associated in the population in question, since those who served in Vietnam in spite of not having their draft number called are more likely to have been patriotic. Thus, P and D are probabilistically dependent but not causally connected. In sum, a precondition for the PCC is the absence of circumstances in which exogenous variables are correlated, which makes any effort to justify the assumption of independent exogenous variables on the basis of the PCC highly problematic, if not outright circular.
One possible response to the difficulties described in the foregoing paragraph is that there are possible strategies for dealing with them. For example, there are techniques for expunging time-trends from data (cf. Chatfield [1984] , Hamilton [1994] , Clements & Hendry [1999] ), and hence for eradicating correlations that arise from them. Likewise, the unwanted probabilistic dependence in the Vietnam example might be resolved if we considered a broader population consisting of both veterans and nonveterans. However, it might be argued, if the CMC fails as a result of a correlation between pseudo-hidden variables (as imagined in Cartwright's factory example), then there is simply nothing to be done about it-there is no way to remedy the problem. Thus, it might be concluded, the CMC can be irredeemably false for indeterministic causal systems, but not for deterministic ones wherein the CMC can always (in principle) be salvaged through, say, the inclusion of additional causes.
This argument is correct insofar as it maintains that it is possible to construct examples of indeterministic systems in which the CMC fails and cannot be salvaged through the inclusion of further causes or other devices. But the argument is mistaken in asserting that the same is not also true of deterministic cases. For example, imagine two slot machines constructed entirely independently of one another but which, coincidentally enough, have precisely the same initial conditions and internal mechanics.
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In a deterministic world, the outcomes of the two slot machines will be perfectly correlated in spite of the utter lack of causal connection between them, and no amount of considering additional causes and so on will eliminate this violation of the CMC. One could even imagine a deterministic version of Cartwright's factory example in which coincidentally parallel deterministic processes of the sort just described were the source of the perfectly correlated exogenous variables and in (6). Of course, such a scenario might seem implausible, but if the issue is merely the bare conceivability of irredeemable failures of the CMC, then such exist for deterministic as well as indeterministic causal systems.
In sum, there is at present no compelling reason in the abstract for supposing the CMC a more reliable assumption for deterministic than for indeterministic systems. The same assumptions suffice in both cases for the CMC, and in both cases failures of these assumptions lead to failures of the condition. In both cases, the CMC is assured of holding in the context of a perfectly designed and implemented controlled experiment. In both cases, it may or may not be possible in principle to remedy failures of the CMC. Most importantly, beyond the context of controlled experiments, there is no compelling, general account of why one should suppose that exogenous variables are independent, even for an underlying causally sufficient FM. If such a justification could be found, perhaps it could be used to show that the assumption of independent exogenous terms is more reliable given determinism than otherwise. Until such time, however, the causal Markov theorem cannot be used a basis for the claim that indeterminism is an especially hostile environment for the CMC.
EPR
A commonly provided case of a failure of the CMC is the famous Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) example (cf. van Fraassen [1982] ; SGS [2000] , pp. 37-8). Since quantum mechanics is often presumed to be a fundamentally indeterministic theory, it might seem that this case provides support for the view that indeterminism threatens the CMC. That is, perhaps there is reason to think that the CMC is more problematic in the context of indeterministic than deterministic systems in the world we actually inhabit, even if there is no reason in principle why this must be so.
Without going into the details, the essential idea of the EPR example is the following. Consider two electrons emitted from a common source traveling independently of one another. Imagine that one electron goes to the left and the other to the right, thereby allowing us to conveniently label them e R and e L , respectively. Suppose that there are two mutually exclusive properties of 'spin up' and 'spin down', which the electrons may possess. For the moment, however, neither electron has spin up nor down; rather, each electron is in 'superposition' between these two properties. Now imagine that we undertake to measure the spin of e R . Quantum mechanics tells us the following. First, we have a 50% chance of observing that e R has spin up and 50% chance of observing that it has spin down (we can never observe an electron in superposition). Second, if we find that e R has spin up, then we can predict with certainty that a measurement of e L will reveal that it has spin down, and vice versa. We can repeat the experiment as many times as we like. We always observe that if the electron on the right has spin up, then the one on the left has spin down; if the one on the right has spin down, then the one on the left has spin up.
So there is a perfect negative correlation between the spins of the electrons on the right and the left. Yet Bell's famous theorem shows that this correlation cannot be accounted for by any local common cause, where a 'local common cause' would be one in the past light cone of the two electrons. Moreover, the correlation would obtain no matter what physical barrier or distance separated the right and left electrons. Thus, it is doubtful that observing that the electron on the right has spin up causes the electron on the left to have spin down. Hence, this seems to be a case of a physically real situation in which indeterminism contributes to a failure of the CMC. Notice that the structure of this case is very similar to Cartwright's factory example: there is a genuinely indeterministic common cause of two variables that are perfectly correlated (or inversely correlated in the EPR example).
There is a lively and complex discussion concerning whether the EPR example, and similar cases, are indeed genuine counter-instances to the PCC, and thereby to the CMC (cf. Redhead [1987] , Healey [1992] , Redei [1997] , Berkovitz [1998] , Clifton & Ruetsche [1999] , Maudlin [1994] , Hausman [1999] , Hausman & Woodward [1999] , pp. 565-6). Fortunately, the relevant point for the purposes of this paper can be made independently of the details of this literature. In particular, the EPR example is a problematic basis for the claim that the CMC is a more reliable assumption for deterministic than indeterministic systems for the simple reason that there is a fully deterministic (though heterodox) interpretation of quantum mechanics, namely Bohm's (cf. Albert [1992] , chapter 7). Bohm's quantum theory predicts precisely the same non-local (and hence putatively non-causal) correlations in the EPR example as the standard, indeterministic interpretation. Hence it is far from clear that the blame for the (putative) counter-example can be laid at the door of indeterminism.
Even if the EPR example were a straightforward indeterministic counterinstance to the CMC, it would not necessarily follow that the CMC is a more reliable assumption in the deterministic context. Deterministic systems can fail to satisfy the CMC too; hence, showing that indeterministic systems sometimes actually do so would not be sufficient to demonstrate the greater reliability of the CMC for deterministic systems. One would also need to demonstrate that failures are, in some sense, more frequent for indeterministic systems. But showing this would require some justification of the assumption that exogenous variables are independent in the deterministic case, which brings us right back to where we were at the end of the foregoing section.
Conclusion
This essay has shown that the most common justification of the CMC-that it is true of acyclic, deterministic causal systems with independent exogenous variables-can be extended to indeterministic cases. Given the framework proposed here, the only difference between deterministic and indeterministic causal systems is that, in the indeterministic case, some exogenous variables represent inherently probabilistic aspects of the system rather than causes, a difference that was shown to be immaterial to the causal Markov theorem. Consequently, what matters to deciding whether the CMC is an appropriate assumption in a given context is that the system is acyclic and its exogenous variables independent. If these conditions are fulfilled, it is irrelevant to the CMC whether the causal system is deterministic or indeterministic, a point illustrated by reference to controlled experiments. Since there is no apparent reason to suppose that indeterministic systems are more prone to be cyclic than deterministic ones, if the CMC is a more reliable assumption when determinism obtains than otherwise, it must be because exogenous variables are more frequently independent in the deterministic case. However, there is at present no convincing reason to suppose that this is so. As a result, there is currently no firm basis for the proposition that indeterministic causal systems are an especially hostile environment for the CMC.
